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Abstract
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Inicio del Plan Colombia: efectos en homicidios  
y muertes violentas
Resumen
En este documento se analiza la relación entre el Plan Colombia y la violencia. Este artículo 
explota las diferencias regionales del éxito del programa para identificar los efectos potenciales 
sobre los homicidios y las muertes violentas. Los resultados muestran efectos no significa-
tivos en los homicidios. Por otro lado, se encontraron evidencias de aumentos en el número 
de muertes violentas para el caso de las mujeres que habitan las áreas urbanas, y el efecto 
contrario para las que viven en las rurales. Los resultados son consistentes para diferentes es-
pecificaciones del modelo, periodos de cobertura del programa y clasificación de las regiones.
Clasificación JEL: R10, H5, K1.
Palabras clave: homicidios, análisis regional, Plan Colombia.
Inicio do Plano Colômbia: efeitos em homicídios  
e mortes violentas
Resumo
Neste documento analisa-se a relação entre o Plano Colômbia e a violência. Este artigo explora 
as diferencias regionais de sucesso do programa para identificar os efeitos potenciais sobre 
os homicídios e as mortes violentas. Os resultados mostram efeitos não significativos nos 
homicídios. Por outro lado, se encontraram evidências de aumentos no número de mortes 
violentas para o caso das mulheres que moram em áreas urbanas, e o efeito contrário para as 
que moram nas áreas rurais. Os resultados são consistentes para diferentes especificações do 
modelo, períodos de cobertura do programa e classificação das regiões.
Classificação JEL: R10, H5, K1.
Palavras-chave: homicídios, análise regional, Plano Colômbia.
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1 Introduction
Historically, the relationship between security policies and crime has been of 
great interest for a number of disciplines. Becker (1968) on the one hand, and 
Ehrlich (1974) on the other both offer analyses where criminals make the de-
cision to commit crimes based on the potential benefits and the probability of 
receiving punishment in terms of apprehensions and/or monetary compensa-
tions to society. It was only recently that the increased availability of data and 
the new methodologies have enabled us to unravel the elusive relationship 
between security policies –in terms of increased financial and human resour-
ces– and crime rates.1
Most of the literature has focused on either developed countries or on the 
impact of security measures adopted for fighting criminal activities in urban 
areas (see Di Tella and Schargrodski, 2004 for Argentina, Klick and Tabarrock, 
2005 for Washington D.C., Machin and Marie, 2005 for England and Wales, and 
Draca et al., 2009 for London).2 Not many studies deal with these issues in de-
veloping countries, which are more likely to face both a wider range of criminal 
actors and higher levels of crime as such. Colombia, in particular, has been of 
major interest because of the coexistence of the world’s oldest guerrilla group, 
the drug producers and dealers, and paramilitary groups as well as urban gangs. 
Over the past three decades, these criminals and their actions have mutated to 
survive despite the actions of the authorities.
The effects of the Plan Colombia program on homicides and other types 
of violent deaths are analyzed in this paper.3 A key feature is that the policy 
seems to have had disproportionate effects on the different coca producing 
departments. Under these conditions, various strategies were considered for 
looking at homicides and violent deaths in those departments with high-coca-
1 Cameron (1988) shows how researchers were handcuffed for a number of decades by 
their intention to resolve the dilemma with respect to the direction of causality in the relation-
ship between police presence and crime.
2 All these studies also tried to deal with the causality problem between police presence 
and crime levels through quasi-experimental strategies based on terrorist actions in most of 
the cases. 
3 The program is a Colombian initiative starting in 1999/2000 which had been partly 
sponsored by the American government and was intended to reduce the supply of illegal 
drugs, cocaine in particular. To do this, the two governments agreed that the specific target 
would be to cut the number of hectares of coca bushes in Colombia in half by 2005. The total 
investment during the first six years of the program was approximately US$11 billion (12,5 % 
of Colombia’s average GDP between 2000 and 2005) which was used to increase the manpower 
of the military and police forces, purchase and improve military equipment, and give military 
and human rights training.
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destruction relative to low-destruction and non-producer ones before and after 
the implementation of the program.
Among the most recent studies of the situation in Colombia, Angrist and 
Kugler (2008), Barón (2008), and Pérez (2012a,b) are the most notable. All of them 
looked at quasi-experiments to circumvent the corresponding endogeneity pro-
blems. Angrist and Kugler address the causal relationship between the increase 
in coca cultivation in the early nineties and violence as well as the potential 
effects on the labor market in the rural areas. They used the 1,000 hectare thres-
hold under cultivation to classify the treatment and control groups and found 
consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that more coca production brings 
about more violent deaths since coca supports organized criminals in rural areas.
Barón (2008) makes use of the Plan Colombia program to address the causal 
relationship between this program and violence, homicides, and partner abuse. 
To classify the treatment and control groups of departments he uses the 1,000 
hectares of coca crops destroyed under the argument that this is a critical point 
from which coca activities might affect criminality in Colombia. The results 
show significant reductions in homicides in those regions where the program 
seems to have had stronger presence, and no significant effects on partner abuse 
were found.
Pérez (2012a) analyzes the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) implemented 
by the incoming government in 2002 and its causal effects on a wide range of 
crimes. There are differentiated results based on the types of crimes commit-
ted and the type of perpetrator. Strong and significant reductions were found 
for those crimes commonly committed by organized crime such as terrorism, 
kidnappings, auto-theft, and terrestrial piracy, but no effects from the policy on 
crimes usually committed by common criminals in urban areas such as burgla-
ries and street robberies.
The present study contributes to the literature in several ways. Previous 
studies on this topic analyzed the effects of Plan Colombia on violence using 
data from 2000 to 2005. This strategy disregards the effect caused by an overlap 
with a national policy implemented during 2002/2003 (the Democratic Security 
Policy, DSP), a strategy for which the main purpose was to reduce criminality 
(homicides included). This might be causing serious upward biases on the es-
timates and clouding the potential real effects of the program on the outcome 
variables. In this paper, a post-policy period free of the overlapping effects 
with the DSP is used to clarify which of the effects were the real effects of the 
program on homicides.4
4 Another potential confounding factor avoided by choosing this period of analysis is 
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The second contribution has to do with the classification of the regions into 
treatment and control groups. A relative measure (coca crops destroyed as a per-
centage of the total coca cultivation) and its distribution among the departments 
were used to classify the treatment and control regions. This approach naturally 
categorizes the two groups by means of a relative, comparable measure. I be-
lieve this strategy is stronger and a way that is even more consistent to look at 
the impact of economic and police resources on homicides and violent deaths.5 
Additionally, the departments were classified into three groups, instead of two: 
high-destruction, low-destruction, and non-producers. This approach made 
it possible to carry out additional exercises in order to test the robustness and 
assumptions of the empirical approach.6
The estimates show that there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
the implementation of Plan Colombia significantly reduced homicides although 
it seems to have had differentiated positive/negative effects across gender and 
location on violent deaths in high-coca-destruction regions relative to the low-
destruction and non-producing regions. This was the conclusion I reached after 
using a highly-disaggregated database for deaths and after carrying out a series 
of exercises and robustness checks testing for different specifications of the ba-
seline model and different alternatives for the comparison groups.
My argument in this paper is that, whereas it is undeniable that Plan 
Colombia’s economic resources have played an important role in enhancing 
security and reducing the areas under coca cultivation, it is also true that reduc-
tions in homicides were not an effect of Plan Colombia but perhaps a result of 
the Democratic Security Policy.7 The main purpose of this latter strategy, which 
was implemented by the incoming government in 2002, was to cut down on the 
high levels of criminality in the country. Also note that it was precisely between 
1999 and 2002, four years after Plan Colombia’s implementation, that crime 
indicators reached the highest recorded levels in the country.
the peace seeking talks between the Colombian government and the self-defense group of 
paramilitaries. These talks started in June 2003. The two security strategies, if not properly 
treated, could have given the causal effects from Plan Colombia an upward bias.
5 As mentioned before, previous studies analyzing the effects of coca crops and vio-
lence in Colombia (Angrist and Kugler, 2008 and Barón, 2008) have used subjective ways to 
distinguish the two groups. Specifically, they used 1,000 hectare increase and 1,000 hectare 
destruction of coca crops respectively. These classification strategies suffer from two main 
drawbacks. They are absolute and subjective measures, which might be contributing even 
more in obscuring the real effects of the program on the outcome variables.
6 For example, having two potential control groups made it possible to test for the un-
counfoundedness assumption.
7 Contraloría General de la Nación (2001) presented a first evaluation report on the first 
results from Plan Colombia. More recently, GAO (2008) presented an updated report.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Plan Colombia program 
and its scope is briefly described in section 2. The nature of the classification 
of regions is explained in section 3 and some descriptive statistics of the data 
are provided. The empirical strategy and model are described in section 4. In 
section 5, the estimates of the impact of PC on homicides and violent deaths are 
presented, together with some robustness exercises. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 Plan Colombia Program
Between 1994 and 1999, Colombia faced a steep increase of more than 350 % in 
coca bush cultivation as a result of the decrease in the activities of the other two 
major producers, Perú and Bolivia. The consequences, apart from the obvious 
increase in cocaine production and export, were the strengthening of the ille-
gal armed groups and the increase in violence and crime. In 1999, just one year 
after the start of a new government, the Plan Colombia program was carried 
out for the first time.
At the beginning, the main goals of Plan Colombia were: fighting against 
drug production and trafficking as well as related organized crime activities, im-
proving the economy and democratic institutions, and moving ahead on peace-
seeking talks with the insurgent groups. The government specifically sought to 
reduce the number of hectares of coca bushes by half by 2005. At the time the 
program was put into effect, there were 160,100 hectares of coca cultivation.8
The strategy of the Colombian-American partnership was to focus on aerial 
spraying and manual coca bush destruction. Even though there were several 
goals in the original plan that were humanitarian and defensive in nature, the 
involvement and cooperation of the American government and its specific re-
solve to reduce the amount of cocaine entering its territory changed the main 
scope of the program. As a whole, the focus was changed to military matters 
and this has been largely criticized (Ramírez, 2005).9 With respect to this, Mejía and 
Restrepo (2009) show through a game theory approach that given the unlike 
main goals of the two governments (the Colombian and the American), the best 
strategies, those that either maximized the benefits or minimized the costs of 
the war against drug trafficking, are considerably different. For the American 
government, for instance, it would be optimal to focus the resources on the 
8 A complete analysis of the first 10 years of Plan Colombia can be seen in Acevedo 
et al. (2008).
9 Deas (2002) argues in favor of the pertinence of military aid and cooperation.
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trafficking side of the problem only, whereas the Colombian government would 
very much prefer to concentrate on maintaining territorial control, which would 
mean focusing on the production side of the problem.
Assessments of the first phase of the Plan Colombia strategy showed con-
troversial and unexpected results. Even though the Colombian-American part-
nership for reducing cocaine production was able to achieve the objective of a 
50 % reduction in coca crops, something they did not count on was the produc-
tion process’ adaptability to exogenous changes. As mentioned by Mejía and 
Restrepo (2009) and Mejía and Posada (2008), cocaine producers were able to 
produce virtually the same amount of coca leaf, and the corresponding amount 
in cocaine production even with only half of the land they had originally had.10 
What this means is that even though Plan Colombia was effective in accomplis-
hing the means to achieve the main target, it was not successful in reaching the 
target itself. The authors also note that the adaptation was such that the availa-
bility of cocaine as well as its international price remained unchanged after all 
these joint efforts. In a more recent study, after a deep analysis of the cocaine 
production links, Gaviria and Mejía (2011) concluded that the anti-drug policy 
formulated by the Americans and applied by the Colombian government had 
failed and should be changed. In general, they emphasized the necessity for 
more scientifically-based policies to deal with the anti-drug problem instead of 
ideological misconceptions around prohibition or legalization.
In terms of financial resources spent, during the first six years of the program 
a total of US$11 billion, where the Colombian tax-payers faced 65 % of the cost 
and the Americans covered the remaining 35 %, were invested to tackle the 
drug trafficking problem head-on. Most of these resources were spent on the 
modernization of military equipment and training, the increase in the number 
of servicemen in the forces, and human rights training.11
3 Classification of Regions
Regionally, Colombia is divided into 32 departments and the capital city. Of 
these, more than half have been affected by coca cultivation in recent decades. 
10 The number of hectares used to cultivate coca bushes in particular went from 163,300 to 
78,000 between 2000 and 2006 while potential manufacturing of cocaine declined only about 
14 % as it went from 695 to 610 metric tons in the same period of time (UNODC, 2009). This 
result comes from the fact that while in 2000, 4.3 kg were produced per hectare per year, in 
2006, 7.7 were produced on the same tract of land (Mejía and Restrepo, 2009).
11 The number of uniformed police officers per 100,000 inhabitants increased from 191 
in 1999 to 217 in 2005.
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Apart from the particular type of soil required to grow coca leaf, other factors 
such as the distance to populous urban areas and road infrastructure affect coca 
cultivation by making it more difficult to both detect and eradicate (Rocha et 
al, 2010).12 These authors also mention proximity to water sources as a factor 
determining the location of coca crops.
In this paper, I make use of the fact that even though Plan Colombia is a 
national program, it has had disproportionate regional effects on the country. 
This identification strategy, in particular, is based on the different results obtai-
ned from the coca eradication program in the different regions between 2000 
and 2002. A total of 29 regions (covering 33 of the departments), of which 23 
have been officially reported as having significant levels of coca cultivation, are 
considered in this study. A fundamental issue for both the identification and 
the empirical strategy is the belief that it was an exogenous change in the inter-
national coca crop location that caused the implementation of Plan Colombia. 
In fact, in the mid 1990s in an attempt to stop, or at least to reduce, the transit 
of coca leaf from the two largest producers at the time, Perú and Bolivia, to the 
processing laboratories in Colombia, local authorities together with the Ame-
rican government adopted a military strategy consisting of blocking aircraft 
trying to reach Colombian territory.13
In order to identify the treatment and control groups, I analyzed how 
successful the program was between 2000 and 2002 in terms of the coca bush 
destruction. Previous studies have used subjective ways of deciding on the 
treatment and control groups. For example, Barón (2008) sets a 1,000 hectare 
threshold of coca bushes destroyed under which the high/low destruction 
regions were specified.14 I used a less subjective definition based on the distri-
bution of the coca crop destruction as an alternative. Figure 1 shows that there 
is a clearer cut off point dividing the two groups of departments – treatment 
and control – in terms of their success in fighting coca leaf production. Those 
departments, in particular, in which more than 19 % of existing coca crops were 
destroyed between 2000 and 2002, will be considered the high-destruction or 
treatment group (Bolívar, Boyacá, Caquetá, Cauca, Cesar, Chocó, Córdoba, 
12 Echandía (1997), Rubio (2000), and more recently Díaz and Sánchez (2004), offer the 
regional extent of criminal violence in Colombia during the nineties. Peceny and Durnan 
(2006) present the relationship between guerrillas, crime, and the U.S. antidrug policies for 
the same period of time.
13 A more detailed analysis of this strategy can be seen in Kawell (2001).
14 According to the author, this definition rests on the belief that this is a turning point 
that set apart the effects on violence. 
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Cundinamarca, Putumayo, Santander, and Valle) while the remaining de-
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Figure 1. Achievements of Plan Colombia Program (Coca Bushes Destroyed in 
Producing Departments)
Note: United Nations office for Drug Control (UNODC). Based on coca cultivation and destruction carried out 
between 2000 and 2002.
Table 1. Coca Cultivation in Colombia
Departments
Coca crops (ha) Total  destruction (ha)
Destruction 
(%)
2000 2001 2002 (2000-2002) (2000-2002)
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
High  
destruction
Bolívar  5,960  4,824 2,735  3,225 23.9%
Boyacá 322 245  118 204 29.8% 
Caquetá 26,603 14,516 8,412 18,191 36.7% 
Cauca  4,576  3,139 2,120  2,456 25.0%
Cesar 779 0 0 779 100.0%
Chocó 250 354 0 354 58.6%
15 The control group of departments consists of departments with low levels of coca crop 
destruction (Antioquia, La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Meta, Arauca, Magdalena 
and Gran Amazonía), and non-producing departments (Atlántico, Huila, Quindío, Risaralda, 
Sucre, Tolima, Casanare, San Andrés Island, and the capital city Bogotá, D.C).
Continúa
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Departments
Coca crops (ha) Total  destruction (ha)
Destruction 
(%)
2000 2001 2002 (2000-2002) (2000-2002)
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
High destruc-
tion
Córdoba 117 652 385 267 23.1%
Cundinamarca 66 22 57 44 30.6%
Putumayo 66,022 47,120 13,725 52,297 41.2%
Santander 2,826 415 463 2,411 65.1%
Valle 76 184 111 73 19.8%
Low  
destruction
Antioquia 2,547 3,171 3,030 141 1.6%
La Guajira 322 385 354 31 2.9%
Norte Santander 6,280 9,145 8,041 1,104 4.7%
Nariño 9,343 7,494 15,131 1,849 5.8%
Meta 11,123 11,425 9,222 2,203 6.9%
Arauca 978 2,749 2,214 535 9.0%
Magdalena 200 480 644 0 0.0%
Gran Amazonía 24,899 38,486 35,309 3,177 3.2%
Note: United Nations office for Drug Control (UNODC). Gran Amazonía corresponds to the aggregation of five 
departments: Amazonía, Guaviare, Guainía, Vaupés and Vichada. Column 4 corresponds only to the number of 
hectares destroyed. For example for Valle, there was no destruction between 2000 and 2001, but there was between 
2001 and 2002 (184-111=73). Column 5 is computed as the total destroyed as a percentage of the total cultivation 
during the same period (73/371=0.198).
Table 1 shows the number of hectares with coca bushes in producing de-
partments between 2000 and 2002 (columns 1 through 3), the number of hecta-
res destroyed (column 4), and the percentage of destruction relative to the total 
cultivation between 2000 and 2002 (column 5). The table shows this information 
for two groups of departments; the first group (high-destruction) corresponds 
to those departments where Plan Colombia seems to have been successful in 
destroying coca crops, whereas the second (low-destruction) is the group for 
which there was a modest reduction, or even an increase, between 2000 and 
2002. In fact, table 1 provides some evidence of displacement of coca cultivation 
in the different producing departments.
For example, notice that in most of the high-destruction departments, there 
was a sustained reduction in cultivation while in the low-destruction regions, 
there was (between 2000 and 2001) an increase first and then (between 2001 and 
2002) a decrease in cultivation. This significantly reduced the percentage of total 
destruction for this second group. This ‘displacement effect’ might be evidence 
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of the first attempt by the coca producers to survive in the new conditions un-
der Plan Colombia’s strategies. As shown in Pérez (2012a), a second and yet 
more effective way to survive this Colombian/American attempt to reduce the 
supply of illicit drugs was to increase the productivity by doubling the amount 
of cocaine produced on half of the land.
Pressure from the government, in terms of manual and aerial destruction 
under Plan Colombia, is how the goal of reducing the total area under coca 
cultivation was reached. As expected, the highest reductions achieved bet-
ween 2000 and 2002 were in the major producing departments, Putumayo and 
Caquetá, where the number of hectares went from 66,022 ha to 13,725 ha, and 
from 26,603 ha to 8,412 ha respectively. In general, the government managed to 
reduce national coca cultivation from 163,000 ha to 102,000 ha through the pro-
gram during this period. This significant reduction showed its commitment to 
the war against drug production and trafficking.
Table 2. Pre and Post-Policy Homicide Rates
Departments
Total Urban Area Rural Area
Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy
1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
High-
destruction
81 107 90 85 107 91 64 87 4
Bolívar 33 45 53 37 48 57 21 27 35
Boyacá 37 52 48 35 52 47 35 48 47
Caquetá 249 343 173 238 315 155 231 343 171
Cauca 80 106 84 103 145 104 61 75 65
Cesar 57 175 137 63 163 140 46 187 116
Chocó 53 62 46 91 82 53 24 29 19
Córdoba 26 39 29 35 52 36 17 20 18
Cundinamarca 55 74 66 38 56 48 76 94 92
Putumayo 230 184 199 353 164 205 113 166 175
Santander 64 65 56 63 55 46 64 67 64
Valle 134 171 145 129 163 141 128 159 140
Low-
destruction
93 111 83 90 92 67 90 125 101
Antioquia 176 195 119 179 147 84 160 176 126
Continúa
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Departments
Total Urban Area Rural Area
Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy
1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
La Guajira 52 117 95 83 160 138 14 52 36
Norte Santander 93 234 169 102 226 146 67 170 140
Nariño 31 63 42 42 72 41 20 51 38
Meta 115 142 145 107 97 103 90 190 175
Arauca 126 270 228 141 288 216 101 212 212
Magdalena 72 98 93 85 103 95 49 78 75
Gran Amazonía 107 82 61 118 88 64 70 59 50
Non-Producing 69 72 60 62 61 51 90 127 108
Atlántico 44 49 57 46 47 56 17 36 45
Bogotá D.C. 58 40 34 55 38 33 179 64 21
Caldas 127 188 119 118 172 101 139 216 147
Huila 70 119 96 60 96 68 73 140 128
Quindío 90 105 94 87 94 92 86 150 80
Risaralda 140 162 132 124 142 117 168 174 154
Sucre 39 54 54 31 60 54 53 39 52
Tolima 58 89 66 48 71 46 68 120 102
Casanare 171 133 142 173 146 143 122 73 117
San Andrés 12 7 20 16 9 27 0 0 0
Total Producing 
Departments
99 130 99 107 123 93 74 102 83
Total All 
Departments
88 110 85 89 97 75 77 107 88
Note: The table includes only the coca producing departments. The Gran Amazonía region is the aggregation 
of the following five departments: Amazonas, Guaviare, Guainía, Vaupés, and Vichada. High-destruction de-
partments are those where at least 19 % of the coca crops were destroyed between 2000 and 2002. Deaths and the 
corresponding population projections using the National Department of Statistics (DANE) as the main source.
In terms of homicides, table 2 summarizes some indicators respecting the 
pre and post-policy rates. Columns 1 through 3 show the results for the country 
as a whole; columns 4 through 6, for the urban areas; and columns 7 through 9, 
for the rural areas. In order to make the comparison between the pre and post-
policy easier and to deal with the significant year to year variation in the rates, 
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1998 is reported here as the pre-policy period and 2002 and 2003, as the post-
policy periods.16
Homicides rates show some interesting characteristics. First is the fact that, 
with few exceptions, the number of homicides per 100,000 persons continued to 
rise between 1998 and 2002 even though Plan Colombia had been in operation 
for some time. These results were found for all three groups of departments 
—high-destruction, low-destruction, and non-producing— and included both 
urban and rural areas. Reductions did not show up until 2003 when the DSP was 
already in operation. Second, in terms of the comparison between producing 
and non-producing departments, the table provides some indications that even 
though more homicides were committed in the coca producing departments 
relative to non-producing ones in the country as a whole (columns 1 through 3), 
the disaggregation into areas of residence reveals that this is only the case for 
the urban areas (columns 4 through 6). In contrast, for the rural ones (columns 7 
through 9), the non-producing departments seem to deal with this type of crime 
more than the producing ones.
Year
Department type





















High-destruction Low-Destruction + Non-producers
Figure 2. Homicides Rates – Men and Women Aged 15-64. (By Type of Department)
Note: Deaths and the corresponding population projections using the National Department of Statistics (DANE) 
as the main source.
16 2003 is included in table 2 as one of the post-policy years even though the post-policy 
period is defined as being from 2000 to 2002 for the main estimates reported in the analysis 
section. Nevertheless, robustness checks extended this period into 2003. 
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In order to give a closer look at the dynamics of the homicide rates, figure 2 
plots the comparison of the pre and post-policy trends for the treatment and 
control departments. During the pre-policy period (1998-1999), homicide rates 
for both groups show a noticeably similar upward trend which goes beyond 
Plan Colombia’s starting point in 2000. Regarding the post-policy trends and 
turning points, there are two noticeable break downs which coincide with the 
two most recent security policies in Colombia’s recent history. The first one is 
in 2000 and corresponds to Plan Colombia’s starting point, and the second and 
more noticeable is in 2002, which coincides with the commencement of the DSP. 
Although both policies seem to be effective in reducing homicides, there is an 
important difference between the two. This is the fact that the turning point 
in 2000 did not result in a positive-to-negative change in the gradient as it did in 
2002. These facts seem to offer a first indication of the argument that it was the 
DSP which put the economic and military resources to the best use to bring 
down the staggering crime levels. Nevertheless, since the new security policy 
started in August 2002, it seems likely that there was room for some influence 
by Plan Colombia in the reduction of homicides.17
Table 3. Pre and Post-Policy Violent Death Rates (excluding homicides)
Departments 
Total Urban Area Rural Area
Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy
1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)
High-
destruction
48 47 44 50 44 40 40 46 47
Bolívar 24 22 20 28 24 22 12 13 11
Boyacá 55 63 58 51 59 51 51 63 62
Caquetá 81 63 69 93 59 52 60 61 83
Cauca 51 52 56 70 64 61 34 42 50
Cesar 30 41 40 37 42 43 15 32 29
Chocó 28 31 27 41 42 33 17 16 9
Córdoba 33 29 29 40 36 34 26 15 18
Cundinamarca 55 59 53 50 48 44 55 72 66
Putumayo 69 76 68 82 91 79 53 60 44
17 In order to take this possibility into consideration, additional robustness checks were 
done by adding one additional period to include 2003. 
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Departments 
Total Urban Area Rural Area
Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy Pre-Policy Post-policy
1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003 1998 2002 2003
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)
Santander 51 44 47 53 36 38 45 55 58
Valle 57 52 46 54 47 41 63 63 66
Low-
destruction
51 44 43 50 38 37 47 51 50
Antioquia 64 56 50 64 42 38 64 63 60
La Guajira 32 26 24 46 37 33 16 10 13
Norte Santander 45 51 54 46 47 45 40 49 55
Nariño 40 51 57 54 59 62 29 43 48
Meta 76 61 65 71 46 55 53 65 52
Arauca 78 67 55 86 53 50 60 84 58
Magdalena 34 32 27 42 32 27 19 29 22
Gran Amazonía 54 67 48 65 52 59 37 65 34
Non-Producers 47 38 38 44 34 34 54 51 53
Atlántico 30 23 23 30 21 23 25 24 16
Bogotá D.C. 43 33 31 41 31 30 235 32 42
Caldas 51 50 63 50 45 61 50 58 60
Huila 76 66 63 75 67 55 74 60 67
Quindío 54 43 48 52 38 45 47 68 55
Risaralda 48 42 40 46 38 35 51 47 45
Sucre 29 24 28 38 27 30 12 16 22
Tolima 72 59 55 69 53 50 68 65 59
Casanare 92 68 82 105 65 71 49 59 91
San Andrés 52 38 18 71 46 18 0 8 16
Total Producing 
Departments
51 49 46 53 44 41 42 48 47
Total All 
Departments
50 45 43 50 40 38 44 49 48
Note: The table includes only the coca producing departments. The Gran Amazonía region is the aggregation of the 
following five departments: Amazonas, Guaviare, Guainía, Vaupés, and Vichada. High-destruction departments 
are those where at least 19 % of the coca crops were destroyed between 2000 and 2002. Deaths and the correspon-
ding population projections use the National Department of Statistics (DANE) as the main source.
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For violent deaths, table 3 provides a summary of the rates at different levels 
of aggregation: individual departments and the aggregation of high-destruction, 
low-destruction, and non-producing departments. Furthermore, we find the pre 
and post-policy violent death rates for the national aggregation in columns 1 
through 3, urban areas in columns 4 through 6, and rural areas in 7 through 9. 
Considering the high and low-producing aggregations, the table shows a ge-
neralized slight reduction in the number of violent deaths per 100,000 persons 
after the implementation of Plan Colombia with the exception of the rural areas, 
where the rate went from 40 to 46 in the high-increase group, and from 47 to 51 
in the low-increase group between 1998-2002. Non-producing departments on 
the other hand show a sustained and generalized reduction in violent death rates 
in both urban and rural areas. As in the case of homicides, non-coca-producing 
departments showed fewer violent deaths than the coca-producing ones. The 
rural areas, where coca-producing departments seemed to face lower levels of 
violent deaths were again the exception.
Year
Department type























High-destruction Low-Destruction + Non-producers
Figure 3. Violent Death Rates – Men and Women Aged 15-64. (By Type of Department)
Note: Deaths and the corresponding population projections using the National Department of Statistics (DANE) 
as the main source.
In terms of the comparative dynamics of violent deaths for treatment and 
control groups in the pre and post policy period, figure 3 shows a first indica-
tion of the temporal coincidence between the reduction in the rate of violent 
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deaths and the starting point of the Plan Colombia strategies. In particular, 
figure 3 shows a turning point in 1999 for the control group and in 2000 for the 
treatment group. Two characteristics supporting the identification assumption 
for this analysis should also be mentioned. The first is the similar pre-policy 
trends between the two groups, and the second is the way the post-policy is 
characterized by the swap of positions between the rates of the two groups.
4 Empirical Strategy
The aim of this study is to use the variation in the number of hectares with coca 
crops induced by Plan Colombia as a means of identifying its impact on homi-
cides and violent deaths. Since there are similar pre-policy trends for treatment 
and control groups for both homicides and violent deaths, and given the three-
level disaggregation of the data, it is possible to work with the following spe-
cification:




a d t d t dt adt (1)
where the two parts of the dependent variable dadt and padt are the number 
of deaths and the population in the corresponding age group a, department d 
and time t. In this study, variable d will refer to two different types of deaths, 
homicides and violent deaths. The first three terms on the right hand side are 
defined as follows: aa is the age effect, bd is the regional (department) effect and 
lt is the time (year) effect. The fourth term is the interaction between an indica-
tor variable for those departments with high coca-crop destruction (HD), and a 
dummy variable for Plan Colombia’s first three years of operation (PC).18
The fifth term X corresponds to a set of department/time varying controls, 
which includes local security expenditures and the GDP per-capita. These 
two variables are determined to be convenient controls for factors that could 
otherwise cloud the real causal effects of Plan Colombia on the outcome varia-
bles. The first one emerges from the fact that the program was thought of and 
put into action by the national government with the national budget. Thus, the 
department’s own efforts to fight illegal activities could bias the Plan Colombia’s 
18 As mentioned before, only the first three years of Plan Colombia were considered in 
order to avoid overlapping with the Democratic Security Policy, implemented late in 2002. 
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efforts upwards. A second general consideration that might distort the results 
is the difference in the degree of socioeconomic development across the diffe-
rent regions. In this case, the GDP per-capita is included in the model under 
the assumption that this indicator is capturing the socioeconomic progress. 
Finally, the last term on the right hand side, e, corresponds to the error term. In 
order to control for potential omitted variable bias and serial correlation, some 
specifications include type-of-department (high and low-increase) time trends.
Given the particular characteristics of the outcome variables, homicides and 
violent death rates with discrete and nonnegative values only, it is necessary to 
use an estimating strategy to deal with this discreteness and nonlinearity.19 For 
the purpose of this paper, the Negative Binomial model is used. This is a general 
approach dealing with equidispersion, or the condition under which the expected 
value and the variance are the same).20
5 Results and Robustness Checks
5. 1 Homicides
The baseline estimates of the impact of Plan Colombia on homicide rates are 
calculated using equation (1) and the results are listed in Table 4.21 For each 
of these two groups in the population (men and women), the specifications 
build up from a model including type-of-department specific time trends, and 
fixed effect dummies for age groups, departments (regions) and time (years) to 
another where additional controls are included.
As expected, results show no significant effect on either of the two groups in 
the population, men or women. The estimates are prone to take zero to positive 
and negative values in the more complete specifications (trends + controls), co-
lumns (2) and (4), for men and women respectively. As seen in figure 2, although 
the starting point for Plan Colombia in 2000 seems to have reduced the rising 
pattern of homicides, it does not seem to have had enough of an impact for the 
effects to be significantly different from zero.
19 The data have a high proportion of zeros (about 15 % of the total observations). There-
fore, standard linear methods are not appropriate since the data is heteroskedastic and the 
conditional expectation is nonlinear and positive. 
20 
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21 Barón (2009) presents a very detailed analysis of homicides during the first years of 
Plan Colombia. This paper presents the regional extent of the problem including different 
socioeconomic characteristics.
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Table 4. Effects of Plan Colombia on Homicides. (National Level - Comparison of Men 
and Women)
Dependent Variable: Homicide Rate
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls
(1) (2) (3)  (4)
Interaction term 
0.072 0.083 -0.124 -0.121
(0.082) (0.084) (0.192) (0.192)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log Local security expenditures No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of homicides per 100,000 persons aged between 15 
and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 5. Effects of Plan Colombia on Homicides. (Urban and Rural Areas Comparisons)
Dependent Variable: Homicide Rate
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls











Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log Local security expenditures No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
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Dependent Variable: Homicide Rate
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls










Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log Local security expenditures No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of homicides per 100,000 persons aged between 15 
and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
(a) Because of non-convergence in the Negative Binomial Model, the alternative Poisson estimates are reported.
Across areas of residence, table 5 shows how some differences are more no-
ticeable including both gender and areas of residence. Although the effects are 
not statistically significant except for men in the urban areas where homicides 
seem to have increased in the treatment departments after PC started, all of the 
estimates are consistently negative. The program seems to have had a negative 
impact on homicides of men and women in the countryside and on women in 
urban areas. However, what is more important because of its significance and 
magnitude, is the situation of men living in urban areas where this type of crime 
increased. Note that these findings are consistent with the internal conflict in 
Colombia, where the rural-positioning-strategy of the most influential illegal 
armed groups brought about security policies that focused mostly on the rural 
areas and neglected general criminality in urban areas.22
So far no attention has been given to the possibility that the turning point 
in 2002, and the corresponding reduction in homicides, may have been due to 
a four-year-lagged result of Plan Colombia instead of the Democratic Security 
22 For more details on urban and rural crime dynamics from the beginning to the midpoint 
of the 1st decade of the 21st century see Pérez (2012a). 
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Policy. The structural change is evident when one looks at figure 2, which shows 
a large relative decrease in homicide rates for both the high and low-destruction 
departments. Although this possibility is unlikely since the coca cultivation 
reduction target in Plan Colombia was met from the very outset of the policy 
(see Appendix A), additional robustness checks were carried out in order to 
include this possibility.
Columns (2) and (4) of table 6 report the estimates that utilize the alterna-
tive from the 2000/2003 post-policy period compared to the initial 2000/2002 
(columns 1 and 3). The results from these new specifications are interesting even 
though the estimates remain similar in most of the cases.23 On the one hand, 
there was a reduction with respect to the previous negative estimates when 2003 
was included within the post-Plan Colombia period.
Table 6. Effects of Plan Colombia on Homicides. (Comparison between Two Different 
Post-Policy Periods)










(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. URBAN AREAS
Interaction term
0.246** 0.146* -0.039 0.031
(0.104) (0.084) (0.255) (0.217)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample  Size 1250 1500 1250 1500
B. RURAL AREAS
Interaction term
-0.122 (a) -0.119 (a) -0.470 -0.639**
(0.170) (0.121) (0.330) (0.279)
23 These results have to be carefully analyzed since the number of observations is different 
for the two post-policy periods. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample  Size 1250 1500 1250 1500
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of homicides per 100,000 persons aged between 15 and 
64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Given the different number of observations used to compute 
the estimates in columns (1) and (2) and (3) and (4), any comparison between them must be carefully carried out.
(a) Because non-convergence in the Negative Binomial Model, the alternative Posisson estimates are reported.
On the other hand, the effect for women living in rural areas is still nega-
tive, but this time it is significant since it shows a reduction in homicides for 
women living in treatment departments compared with women living in con-
trol departments after the policy started. What is important from these results 
is that these reductions are consistent with the dynamics of homicides and 
other crimes which have occurred in Colombia since 2002. However, what is 
more important is the fact that there is still no evidence of any causal effect from 
Plan Colombia on reductions in homicides even four years after its implemen-
tation. This is particularly evident for men, who are more likely to be affected 
by conflict.
In order to cover another possible source of ambiguity in exploring the 
potential effects of the program on homicides, two additional criteria for choo-
sing high and low-coca-destruction departments were defined. Table 7 shows 
these two new alternatives compared with the baseline definition. The first one 
(criterion 1 in column 1) classifies departments as high or low-destruction (or 
treatment and control groups) depending on whether over 1,000 hectares of co-
ca crops were destroyed during the post-policy period. In this paper, it is used 
as a reference for comparison with previous studies. As a second alternative, 
criterion 2 in column (2) provides a measurement of the net coca bush destruc-
tion. This takes into account not only the number of hectares destroyed but 
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also the new crops planted. Under this criterion, high-destruction departments 
are defined as those with a net destruction greater than zero. Finally, for com-
parison purposes, criterion 3 in column (3) shows the baseline results used in 
this study.
Table 7. Effects of Plan Colombia on Homicides. (Comparison between Three 
Different Treatment/Control Definitions)
Dependent Variable: Homicides






Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 29 29 29





Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.707 0.689 0.707
Number  of departments 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250
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Dependent Variable: Homicides






Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of homicides per 100,000 persons aged between 15 
and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Criteria are based on the following definitions: Cri-
terion 1 makes use of the 1,000 hectares with coca crops destroyed to distinguish the high and low-destruction 
departments. Criterion 2 uses the comparison between the total number of hectares destroyed and the total 
number of new ones, where the threshold between the high and low-destruction is determined by whether 
or not the difference is greater than zero. Finally Criterion 3, which is the baseline in this study, uses the coca-
destruction density itself in the producing departments to discriminate between high and low coca crop des-
truction. Based on this principle, producing departments with more than 19 % coca destruction are classified as 
high-destruction.
This additional robustness check in table 7 is not intended to make the es-
timates for the three different classifications comparable with each other, but 
to look for consistency in terms of significance and direction of the potential 
causal effects of Plan Colombia on homicide rates. The first noticeable charac-
teristic is that estimates for the first two new criteria (columns 1 and 2), show 
zero to negative effects not only for the national aggregation but also for urban 
and rural areas.
The second characteristic is that criteria 1 and 2 tend to show stronger nega-
tive effects in all the cases relative to criterion 3. This is especially noticeable in 
rural areas where all criteria are coincident in the negative direction of the effect 
for criterion 1. These two are coincident even in magnitude and show a reduc-
tion of about 20 percentage points in homicides as a result of Plan Colombia. 
These results show some degree of sensitivity of the results, not in the direction 
but in the strength of the effects based on different classification alternatives. 
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Nevertheless, and as seen before, these results are highly robust to different 
specifications, program cut-off points, and desegregations.
5.2 Violent Deaths
In order to extend the scope of the potential effects of Plan Colombia, in this 
section, the set of other deaths classified as ‘violent’ are considered the outcome 
variable in contrast to natural deaths, deaths from diseases, or homicides. The 
purpose behind this idea is to establish whether or not the economic resources 
and the increase in the police forces, even though mainly focused on the eradi-
cation of coca crops in rural Colombia, could have had side effects in terms of 
an improvement in the overall levels of security and confidence in the national 
institutions during the early post Plan Colombia period. 24
The first indication of a potential causal relationship between the set up of 
Plan Colombia and the reduction in violent deaths is the temporal synchroniza-
tion between the two (as seen in Figure 3) since 1999 and 2000 are the years when 
the rising trend in violent deaths changes for both low and high-destruction 
departments. Reductions in the number of violent deaths are expected in those 
regions where Plan Colombia was more effective in terms of coca crop destruc-
tion relative to those in which there was low destruction. Table 8 shows a first 
exercise, a national aggregation for men and women, where this hypothesis is 
explored.
Table 8. Effects of Plan Colombia on Violent Deaths. (National Level - Men and 
Women Comparison)
Dependent  Variable: Violent  Deaths
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls
(1)   (2)   (3)    (4)
Interaction term 
0.066 0.064 0.240 0.262*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.151) (0.152)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log Local security expenditures No Yes No Yes
24 Fajnzylber et al. (1999) and Gaitán (1995) present the main causes of violent crime in 
Colombia during the last decades of the twentieth century.
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Dependent  Variable: Violent  Deaths
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls
(1)   (2)   (3)    (4)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of violent deaths per 100,000 persons aged between 
15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Results are divided into two groups of the population, men in columns (1) 
and (2) and women in columns (3) and (4), where each gender has two models 
with trends and two with trends plus controls. Estimates show different results 
for both men and women with zero to positive and no significant effects on the 
male population, and with an unexpected positive and strong effect for women. 
According to these results, after the implementation of Plan Colombia, violent 
deaths affecting women increased by about 25 percentage points in those re-
gions with high-destruction of coca crops relative to those regions where low 
levels of destruction were reported. Remember that Plan Colombia focused its 
attention, and most of its economic and military resources, on the countryside 
where coca crops are located. Thus, the next exercise includes a disaggregation 
of the results based on the two areas of residence, urban and rural, in order to 
better understand the previous results.
Table 9. Effects of Plan Colombia on Violent Deaths. (Urban and Rural Areas 
Comparisons)
Dependent Variable: Violent Deaths
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. URBAN AREAS
Interaction term
0.142 0.142 0.449** 0.462**
(0.099) (0.100) (0.203) (0.203)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continúa
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Dependent Variable: Violent Deaths
Men Women
Trends Trends+Controls Trends Trends+Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log  GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log  Local security  
expenditures
No Yes No Yes
Time  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
B. RURAL AREAS
Interaction term
-0.464**(a) -0.462**(a) 0.087 0.084
(0.204) (0.204) (0.275) (0.279)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log  GDP per-capita No Yes No Yes
Log  Local security  
expenditures
No Yes No Yes
Time  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of violent deaths per 100,000 persons aged between 
15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
(a) Because non-convergence in the Negative Binomial Model, the alternative Posisson estimates are reported.
Following a similar strategy, a more extensive disaggregation of the population 
is presented in Table 9, which shows the estimates for the effects of the program 
on violent death rates for urban (panel A) and rural populations (panel B). 
Results reveal some interesting facts. The first one is that after disaggregating 
the population into urban and rural, the positive and significant effect seen in 
the national results remained the same for urban women with increases of about 
45 percentage points in violent deaths. The second result was a clear and signifi-
cant 46 percentage point reduction in violent deaths of men, which is consistent 
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with the two different specifications in the model-trends and trends+controls. 
These results seem to be consistent in terms of the reduction of violent deaths of 
men since rural men were usually more active agents in the conflict. The other 
part of the story is the presumed cross-gender and spatial displacement effect 
where women living in urban areas suffered increases in the number of violent 
deaths. In order to establish how robust these results are and to capture any 
lagged effect from the program, the post-Plan Colombia period was extended 
one additional year.
Results are reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 10 and show that con-
sistently significant but smaller effects were found when extending the period 
beyond 2002 (columns 1 and 3). Nevertheless, a skeptic might argue that the 
previous findings, even though based on a clear distinction between the high 
and low-destruction groups, are the result of the criterion by which the com-
parison groups were chosen instead of the true effects of the program. As in 
homicides, in order to address this possibility and to even more stringently en-
sure that like is being compared with like respecting groups of departments, the 
other two coca-destruction criteria were used. Table 11 shows estimates based 
on the 1,000 hectares destroyed in column (1) and on the positive net number 
of hectares destroyed in column (2). Column (3) is left for comparison with the 
baseline criteria.
Table 10. Effects of Plan Colombia on Violent Deaths. (Comparison between Two 
Different Post-Policy Periods)










(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. URBAN AREAS
Interaction term
0.142 0.131 0.462** 0.380**
(0.100) (0.081) (0.203) (0.171)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security  
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1500 1250 1500
B. RURAL AREAS
Interaction term
-0.462**(a) -0.430** 0.084 -0.012
(0.204) (0.215) (0.279) (0.238)
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security  
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29 29
Sample Size 1250 1500 1250 1500
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of violent deaths per 100,000 persons aged between 
15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Given the different number of observations used 
to compute the estimates in columns (1) and (2) and (3) and (4), any comparison between them must be done 
carefully.
(a) Because non-convergence in the Negative Binomial Model, the alternative Posisson estimates are reported.
Table 11 presents comparisons for gender-aggregated data from national, 
urban, and rural areas. A first view at the national level in panel A allows us 
to see consistent estimates in most of the cases in terms of direction, magni-
tude, and significance where even the standard errors are also very close to 
each other. This means that, at the national level and for aggregations across 
gender and areas of residence, no effects on violent deaths seem to have come 
from Plan Colombia in areas with high coca destruction relative to low des-
truction regions.
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Table 11. Effects of Plan Colombia on Violent Deaths. (Comparison between Three 
Different Treatment/Control Definitions)
Dependent Variable: Violent Deaths






Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security  
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29
Sample  Size 1250 1250 1250




Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security  
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29





Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
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Dependent Variable: Violent Deaths
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
(1) (2) (3)
Log Local security  
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 29 29
Sample  Size 1250 1250 1250
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the number of violent deaths per 100,000 persons aged between 
15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Criteria are based on the following definitions: 
Criterion 1 makes use of the 1,000 hectares with coca crops destroyed to distinguish between the high and low-
destruction groups of departments. Criterion 2 uses the comparison between the total number of hectares destro-
yed and the total number of new ones, where the threshold between the high and low-destruction is determined 
by whether or not the difference is greater than zero. Finally Criterion 3, which is the baseline in this study, uses 
the coca-destruction density itself in the producing departments to discriminate between high and low coca crop 
destruction. Based on this principle, producing departments with more than 19 % coca destruction are classified 
as high-destruction.
Once the analysis is carried out separately for urban and rural areas (panels B 
and C respectively), results show the same strong consistency for the different 
criteria with positive estimates for urban areas and negative for the rural ones. 
The difference is that positive estimates in the urban areas are significant and 
all negative effects in rural regions are not. Two important conclusions can be 
drawn from the former exercises. First, the effects on violent deaths are all con-
sistent with a varied set of specifications. And second, disaggregation of the 
population by gender and areas of residence is of great importance since diffe-
rentiated effects might be found behind national and/or gender aggregations.
5.3 Additional Robustness Checks
The peculiarity of drug production and trafficking in Colombia as well as the 
particular characteristics of the program made it possible to extend the robust-
ness checks even further. This was done to provide stronger and more conclu-
sive evidence supporting not only the former results in which Plan Colombia 
had no effect on homicides and different effects on violent deaths but also the 
identification assumptions.
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To do so I exploited the fact that only 23 out of the 33 departments in the 
country had significant levels of coca cultivation during the period under study 
as well as the fact that the policy had disproportionate results in those coca-pro-
ducing departments. These factors made it possible to classify the departments 
into three different groups: high-coca-destruction, low-coca-destruction, and 
non-coca-producing departments where, under the baseline classification, the 
first group corresponds to the treatment group and the last two to the control 
groups. The first estimate is an exercise consisting of a comparison between 
two additional versions of the baseline model with the definition of the control 
group as the only variation.
Table 12. Effects of Plan Colombia on Homicides and Violent Deaths. (Comparison 






0.055  0.058 0.039
(0.075) (0.087) (0.094)
Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security   
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 19 21
Sample Size 1250 830 860
B. VIOLENT DEATHS
Interaction term 
0.108  -0.044 0.232**
(0.074) (0.081)  (0.095)
Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security   
expenditures
Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continúa
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Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of departments 29 19 21
Sample Size 1250 830 860
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the corresponding number of homicides and violent deaths per 
100,000 persons aged between 15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The results corres-
pond to the national (urban and rural areas) and gender (men and women) aggregations for the post-policy period 
2000/2002. Estimates were computed based on equation (1) including trends and controls on local security expen-
ditures and GDP per-capita. Column (1) corresponds to the estimates using the baseline definition control group 
(low-destruction + non-producing departments); column (2) shows the estimates for the specification using only 
low-destruction departments as a control group; and column (3) corresponds to estimates using non-producing 
departments as a control group. All the specifications use high-destruction departments as the treatment group. 
Given the different number of observations used to compute the estimates for the three different specifications, 
direct comparisons cannot be carried out.
Table 12 shows three different versions for both homicides (panel A) and 
violent deaths (panel B) of the causal effects of Plan Colombia on the outcome 
variables. Column (1) reports the estimates corresponding to the baseline speci-
fication where the control group of departments consists of the low-destruction 
and non-producing departments. Columns (2) and (3) show the estimates of 
a model in which low-coca-destruction departments and non-producing de-
partments are dealt with separately as the control groups.25 These results show 
once again that when non-producers alone are used as control groups, consisten-
cy in terms of no significant effects on homicides and positive significant effects 
on violent deaths improves. Finally Appendix B reports the results of a test that 
seeks to establish whether or not the unconfoundedness assumption holds.26 One 
way to indirectly approximate this test is by using two distinct control groups 
and choosing one of them to be a treatment and the other a control group. The 
way the test works is that the effect should be zero in any case given that none 
of them is really treated. As can be seen in Appendix B, the estimates show no 
significant estimates for either homicides (panel A) or violent deaths (panel B) 
25 Note that estimates in the three columns have to be carefully analyzed since three dif-
ferent specifications of the control group imply three different sample sizes. 
26 This assumption states that, conditional on a set of covariantes, the choice of the treat-
ment and control groups is independent of the outcome variable. 
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for national aggregations and urban or rural areas. Thus I found no reason to 
believe that conditional independence does not hold in this case.
6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, the effects of Plan Colombia on homicides and violent deaths 
were analyzed. This policy intervention was fully implemented in 2000 under 
Colombian/American cooperation which was mainly focused on the reduction 
of coca cultivation in the country. Although additional measures such as promo-
ting social and economic justice and increasing security and not just reducing 
the supply of cocaine were considered for this initiative, the truth is that either 
the program fell short in implementing measures aimed at reducing crimes, or that 
was never its main purpose. In fact Mejía and Restrepo (2009) and Gaviria and 
Mejía (2011) state that once the cooperation of the U.S. government started in 
2000, the fundamental objectives of the program changed radically since the 
Americans had conditioned aid to reducing the supply of illegal drugs and not 
to reducing levels of insecurity in Colombia.
The particular characteristics growing out of the implementation of Plan 
Colombia made it possible to analyze the causation between reducing coca 
cultivation and violent deaths by looking at the impact of additional economic/
military resources on the reduction of homicides and other violent deaths. To 
do so, the number of deaths before and after the policy implementation in the 
regions mainly affected (with high-destruction of coca crops) as compared to 
those where the impact was lower (with low-destruction of coca crops) was 
analyzed. Care was taken to consider only the years for which there was no 
overlapping with the security program which started late in 2002 (specifically 
the so called Democratic Security Policy and peace-seeking talks between the 
Government and the paramilitaries).
The estimates derived from a number of empirical strategies show that while 
there is no evidence of any positive or negative effect on homicides, there are 
differentiated positive/negative effects on violent deaths when disaggregated 
gender and areas of residence are considered. To be specific, even though the 
effect as a whole seems to be an increase in violent deaths, this is the case only 
for women living in urban areas. In contrast, for men in the country, the results 
revealed a reduction in the number of violent deaths. Even though there is clear 
and uncontroversial evidence that the goal set by the Colombian/American coo-
peration was achieved – in terms of a reduction in the number of hectares with 
coca crops but not in terms of reducing the supply of cocaine – no evidence was 
found of any significant effect of this initiative on the reduction of homicides.
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The main contribution of this paper is to present new and conclusive eviden-
ce on the causal relation between Plan Colombia and violent deaths. Previous 
studies had shown a negative and significant relationship between them; howe-
ver, this study made an effort to overcome some potential obstacles in terms of 
the identification strategy and, in particular, the set up of the post-policy period, 
from which it is clear that no causal relationship existed between Plan Colombia 
and the reduction of homicides during the program’s onset.
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Appendix A. Coca Cultivation in Colombia – Number of Hectares,  
1999-2003
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Note: United Nations office for Drug Control (UNODC) and the Government of Colombia.
Appendix B. Unconfoundedness Test for the Effects of Plan Colombia 
on Homicides and Violent Deaths
(Comparison Across National, Urban, and Rural Areas)




-0.001  -0.004  -0.218
(0.106) (0.143) (0.192)
Trends Yes Yes Yes
Continúa
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National Urban Areas Rural Areas
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 18 18 18





Trends Yes Yes Yes
Log GDP per-capita Yes Yes Yes
Log Local security expenditures Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Department dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age-groups dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number  of departments 18  18 18
Sample Size 810 810 810
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable was computed as the corresponding number of homicides and violent deaths per 
100,000 persons aged between 15 and 64. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The results corres-
pond to gender (men and women) aggregations for the post-policy period 2000/2002. Estimates were computed 
including trends and controls on local security expenditures and GDP per-capita. In this case, regressions between 
two different control groups—low-coca-destruction and non-producing—were carried out.
